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ABSTRACT 
This s tudy p roposes t o look at R e d Chips and H Shares and compared their r isk and 
return characterist ic w i th that of the b roader marke t as measured by the All Ord inar ies 
Index. Jn addition，the s tudy outl ined some o f t h e speci f ic and un ique fea tures inherent to 
these t w o categories o f stocks. 
These t w o types o f s t o c k s should be v iewed and analyzed different ly f r o m all o thers o n 
the H o n g K o n g Stock exchange due to the impor tance o f Ch ina t o fu tu re earnings. Fo r 
example，H shares der ive the major i ty o f earnings f r o m the main land whi le the m a n a g e m e n t 
o f R e d Chips is pr imari ly connec ted to the P R C government , which paves the w a y for 
bus iness expans ion via (cheap) asset injections. 
The r isk-return prof i le o f t h e s e s tocks are different from that of o ther s tocks listed on 
the Stock Exchange o f H o n g Kong. The analysis shows that R e d Chips had an average B e t a 
value of 1.2 over the last f ive years. Whi le H shares are n e w to the market，their f ive years 
be ta w a s not available. R e d Chips proved t h e m to b e "aggress ive" . A more detailed analysis 
shows that Be ta values changed over t ime. A n interesting observat ion w a s that H Shares ' 
be ta va lue o f t h e b road market w a s low in Bull runs, but h igh w h e n the market w a s Bear 
market，which can b e interpreted as the H Shares w e r e underper forming. Other stocks on 
the Stock Exchange o f H o n g K o n g derive the major i ty of their earnings f r o m H o n g Kong , 
whereas H Shares der ive theirs from China and R e d Chips have strong relation wi th China 
entities. Therefore the under ly ing fundamenta l economic fac tors affect ing earnings g rowth 
are different and stock valuat ions should ref lect these inherent differences. 
The pr imary measure of risk used in this study is Be ta values, wh ich w a s derived for 
V 
each s tock us ing s imple regress ion. M e a n w h i l e , r e tu rn w a s m e a s u r e d b y to ta l share p r ice 
c h a n g e ( takes in to accoun t share spli ts and dividends) . Th i s s tudy s h o w s tha t t h e h igh r isk 
o f R e d Ch ips w a s not c o m m e n s u r a t e wi th its return. F o r every uni t o f r isk，Red ch ips 
prov ided 1.0356 re turn, wh i l e the average o f all s tocks o n the S tock E x c h a n g e o f H o n g 
K o n g prov ided 2 .775 o f r e t u m . W e a lso c o m p a r e d t h e f ind ings w i t h tha t f r o m the m a r k e t 
indexes，i.e.，AOI，HSCCI, H K C E I and similar f igures are resul ted. 
H o w e v e r , past p e r f o r m a n c e m a y no t represent fiature earn ing potent ial , especia l ly 
w h e n R e d Ch ips are g r o w i n g in impor t ance in local economy. 
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The sovereignty t ransfer of H o n g K o n g from Britain to China in 1997 has 
inevitably affected the stock market in H o n g Kong. H o n g K o n g n o w has a much closer 
relationship wi th China and is increasingly an attractive marke t for China enterprises to 
raise funds. Investors are also seeking investment opportunit ies since H o n g K o n g ' s 
economy may benefi t as it becomes a part o f C h i n a . 
There are two distinct groups of s tocks listed in H o n g K o n g that have strong ties 
wi th the Mainland. These are labelled as Red Chips and H Shares. 
Red Chips are companies listed in H o n g K o n g but principally controlled by 
Mainland China entities. M o s t of them enjoy considerable government support from 
China. In general, their management is quite westernized and is successful in 
combining H o n g Kong advantages and China connections. 
H Shares also enjoy principal control from Mainland parties wi th the additional 
characteristic that they are also incorporated in the Mainland. Dr iven by the 
modernizat ion o f t h e Chinese economy, an increasing number of China enterprises are 
turning t o international capital markets to raise fiinds. One of the options is to publicly 
I 
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list in H o n g Kong. H Shares have provided local investors with direct investment 
opportunities in the thriving mainland economy. Moreover, H Shares have also 
generated considerable interest in the global financial community. 
Org^Tii7Mion o f t h e paper 
This paper leads to discussion on the topic o f R i s k and Return Characteristics of 
the above mentioned Hong Kong listed Red Chips and H Shares. The structure o f t h e 
paper is as follows: 
Chapter 1: Presents the background o f t h i s study and gives brief introduction o f t h e 
two stock groups - Red Chips and H Shares. The origination and scope 
o f t h i s study will be defined. 
Chapter 2: Describes the main characteristics and listing features of Red Chips and 
H Shares, and examines how these two groups of stocks entered into the 
stock market o f H o n g Kong and in what ways they are different from 
other common stocks in Hong Kong. 
Chapter 3: Reviews the risk and return relationships of stock performance and 
discuss on how market model can be applied in this study. 
Chapter 4: A summary o f t h e results is undertaken here, which provides investors a 
better understanding on how Red Chips and H Shares respond to market 
moves. 
Chapter 5: The conclusions o f t h e study is presented in this chapter 
theRkkandUmrn CharacterisHcsofHongKmglistedRed-CkipsandBShares 3 
Relevance o f the stiidv to Hong Kons 
Although there are currently 36 Red Chips and 39 H Shares quoted on the Stock 
Exchange o f H o n g Kong，little academic attention has been devoted to these two asset 
classes. The Political Handover has magnif ied the prominence o f t h e s e t w o groups of 
stocks. As Hong Kong and China are getting closer in terms o f b u s i n e s s and economic 
relations，they rely much more on each other. There are still mountains of State owned 
enterprises in China which need substantial capital to facilitate their business 
development. Fund-raising in the domestic market is unlikely to meet their 
requirement. The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, being the seventh largest stock 
market in the world and the second largest in Asia after J apan \ is well known for its 
transparency and efficiency, and is therefore an attractive market to raise capital. 
Figure 1 compare the performance o f R e d Chips, H Shares and all ordinary stocks 
listed on the Stock Exchange in Hong Kong. The Red Chips appear very volatile with 
the H Shares underperforming the market over the last few years. The ultimate question 
remains: what factors affect the performance o f t h o s e China-related companies, is there 
any differences between the Red Chips and H Shares? Would there be any relationship 
between the returns ofChina-re la ted stocks and the market performance，and would the 
re tum generated from investing in Red Chips or H Shares be sufficient to justify the 
existing risk the potential investor bears，and how this risk compares with each other in 
the two different groups? The findings of this study will certainly provide investors 
with a better understanding of China related stocks in Hong Kong. 
1 Hang Seng Bank's Press Releases 'New Index to Gauge Performance ofChina - Affiliated Companies on the Hong Kong Stock Market" 13 
Jun 1997. 
i 
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Figure 1 hidex performance of Red Chips, H Shares and AU Ordinary Stocks 
Index - Rebased 
(Base Date: 8/7/94 Base: 100) 
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Scope 
It is clear that the main focus o f t h i s s tudy is the H o n g K o n g listed R e d Chips and 
H Shares. The study begins by looking at the general background and the main 
characterist ics of the t w o groups of stocks. Relevant f igures and statistics will be 
shown to demonst ra te their c o m m o n and dif ferent aspects. It then proceeds to analyze 
their re turn relationship to the who le s tock market in H o n g Kong. Whi l e the te rms R e d 
Chips and H Shares are convenient labels fo r China related enterprises, but these 
classif ications sound t o o general. In fact , these companies vary vastly in size and 
industry focus. Therefore , there would also b e sectoral analysis o f these t w o index 
groups. However , as H Shares are too new to the market and most of t h e m w e r e listed 
on the S E H K in the last t w o years, the analysis will thus focus on R e d Chips. 
1 
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CHAPTER II 
RED CHIPS AND H SHARES 
This chapter is divided into three sections, with the first section outlining the 
common characteristics and unique features that can be used to distinguish Red 
Chips and H shares as well as the rise in market value. The following two sections 
will go on to describe Red Chips and H Shares m further detail. 
Section 2 1: The characteristics o fRed Chips and H Shares 
In this section，we will look into the differences and similarities between Red 
Chips and H Shares listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. The key areas 
included market capitalization, business concentrations, and valuation. 
Background 
Owing to the special political position in Hong Kong，there has been growing 
investor interest in China related companies listed on The Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong. This are reflected by the increasing number of listed companies and the market 
capitalization o f R e d Chips and H Shares. Both groups ' weighting in the Hong Kong 
market are almost double the size they were five years ago (see Figure 3). 
Red Chips weighting has increased from 3% at the end of 1993 to 6% at the end 
of 1997 whereas H Shares weighting has increased f rom 0.67% to 1.5% over the same 
period. The total market capitalization of the sectors have risen to a large extent due to 
neHiskan4Beturn CkaractermcsofHongKongMReMMp—tmares 6 
the fol lowing reasons: 
1. Share price increases. As shown in Figure 1, the Red Chips have substantially 
outperformed the broader market over the past year. In spite of the currency crises. 
Red Chips still recorded a 9 .8% increase during 1997.2 
2. Raising of new capital Some existing Red Chips and H Shares have extended 
their market capitalization and uplifted weightings through issuing new shares. 
These fund-raising activities were well accepted by the market during the first 
three quarters of 1997. Investors expected share price to benefit from these events. 
In fact, the capital was to fmance asset injection or to acquire shares o f b l u e chip 
companies in Hong Kong. One typical example is China Everbright Technology 
Limi ted ' s acquisition o f s t o c k in Hongkong Telecom in 1997. 
3, New entrants Favorable sentiment toward the sectors has facilitated new listings 
of shares? As shown in Figure 2, sixteen H Shares were successfiilly listed in 
1997 and most of them recorded huge over-subscription rates upon the Initial 
Public Offering ( f f O ) . Thus contrasts with only six H Share listing in the market 
in 1993. 
The market mania with China-related shares could also be reviewed by the market 
turnover coverage^. In December 1997，the monthly tumover was 20% and 5.7% o f t h e 
market for Red Chips and H Shares respectively.^ Even the Hang Seng Index (HSI) lost 
3 c S . ^ o h L o n . "Red-Chip Survey' Hong Kong Research, C^ldman Sachs 27 Jun 97. 
4 Marketturnover coverage is the turnover as % of the total market (defined by HSI Service Limited) 
5 Information is provided by HSI Services Limited 
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its leading position. During August 1997, the H S F s share of market turnover coverage 
dropped to a historic low o f j u s t 2 4 % compared with the usual 60%' O f t h e 20 most 
actively traded stocks, only seven were fflS constituents. Almost all the remaining 
were Red Chips or H Shares, which together made up 34.7% of the marke t ' s turnover." 
In order to maintain the overall representativeness o f t h e HSI , the H S I Services Limited 
revised one o f t h e selection criteria in which the H S I constituent stocks will no longer 
be required to have a substantial business presence in H o n g Kong. Thus，China related 
stocks could be added to the HSI. By the end of 1997，three of the most actively-traded 
large market capitalization Red Chips are included in the HSI，namely China Resources 
Enterprise Ltd.，Shanghai Industrial Holdings Ltd. and C O S C O Pacific Ltd. Meanwhile 
several local listed companies such as Shun Tak Holdings Ltd. and South China 
Morning Post (Holdings) Ltd. were deleted from the index." 
As a result o f t h e "China Fever", the Hong Kong stock market was structurally 
altered, giving greater weighting to china-related stocks. In addition, two other indexes 
have been created specifically to monitor PRC company performance in Hong Kong ' , 
in which w e will discuss later. Looking ahead，this trend is expected to continue as 
cash-starved China enterprises will continue to t u m to Hong Kong to raise funds. 
e,7.48Hang Seng Bank's Press Releases 'HS1 Services Announces NoChange to the Number ofHang Seng Index Constituents and Launch of 
New Index-16 Dec 1997. 
9 Baldinger, Pamela. -Mainland Companies Settle Down in Hong Kong.' China Business Review, Vol 24’ Issue 6, Nov/Dec 1997’ pp. 4. 
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Sector Distribution 
The const i tuents o f R e d Chips are d i f ferent in size and divers i f ied in bus iness 
practices. They are classif ied into var ious sectors， including B a n k i n g and Finance， 
Cong lomera t e Enterpr ises , Elec t ronic & Electric，Industrial, Oil & Min ing , Proper ty & 
Construct ion, Trading，and Transpor ta t ion (See F igure 4). 
T h e 36 R e d Chips can be divided into th ree large sector g roups _ Cong lomera te 
enterprises . P roper ty & Construction，and Industrials. For each of these sector groups , 
there are seven part icipants , w h i c h sum u p to 5 8 % of total num be r of R e d Chips. 
Never the less , the dominan t sectors w o u l d b e the Cong lomera t e enterprises and 
Proper ty & Const ruct ion groups. Because of their heavy weight ings , the pr ice 
m o v e m e n t s o f s h a r e s in these sectors strongly a f fec t s t he pe r fo rmance o f t h e R e d Chip 
Index，which wil l b e discussed later. Industrial par t ic ipants are numerous but rather 
ins ignif icant in marke t capitalization. Whi l e China Aerospace accounts for 1 .75% of 
R e d Chip Index，the remain ing six compan ies are immater ia l t o the who le g roup as 
contr ibut ing less than 1%. 
The const i tuents o f H Shares appear rather different from R e d Chips. They are all 
concentra ted in industrial sectors. Specifically, they are mainly Heavy Industr ials 
engaged in Infras t ructure , Capital goods , Chemicals and Bui ld ing Mater ia l s (See 
F igure 5). Consequently, their marke t pe r fo rmance is expected to b e closely related to 
the industry circumstances. D e m a n d and supply o f indus t r i a l products , selling price and 
cost o f p r o d u c t i o n , cost of capital and government policies are all de terminant fac tors 
affect ing those H Shares. As H shares ' main entities are located in the Mainland, their 
business focus，to a certain extent , ref lects the economic envi ronment of China, At 
TkeRkkmd_rn ChrnMicsofmmgKmgLi^dR^d^^hip^^^^f^^fh^^^___^  
present, China is devoted to large infrastructure projects and needs foreign capital t o 
finance development. Therefore, flocks of China companies are approved to be listed 
and raise capital abroad. 
Figure 4: Sector distribution ofRed Chips O e^ar ended 97) 
ttBankandFinance 
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Source : compUed with Wandley Cardex andthe guide to companies ofHong Kong 
Figure 5: Sector distribution ofH shares O^ ear ended 97) 
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Price Earning (PyE) Ratio 
Price earnings ratios should vary positively with differences in expected fu ture 
growth in abnormal earnings，and negatively with risk. (The ratio varies according to 
expected changes in abnormal earnings, not earnings per se.y® 
During the period of 1993 - 1997，the broader market P /E ratio average ranged 
between 15X to 2 5 X (see Figure 6). The average P /E ratio o f H Shares, though not 
following in accord with the market pace, fell into the similar boundaries, (i.e. 13X to 
25X. The implications are that the earning patterns and stock performance o f H shares 
could be quite different from other Hong Kong listed companies. In fact, H shares 
business operations are based on the Mainland China. Despite the China fever， 
investors are still conservative and cautious in selecting H shares. They are possibly 
dismayed by H shares ' past performance records and not confident in Chinese-style 
management. 
On the other hand. Red Chips ' average VfE ratio has steadily surpassing the 
market range. The trend is especially apparent in the approach to 1997,s political 
handover, reflecting an expectation of essentially significant growth in abnormal 
earnings o f R e d Chips . 
While some Red Chips still generate the majority of their earnings from Hong 
Kong，they are trading at a higher P /E ratio，partly because of their abilities to exploit 
China earnings. The average P ^ multiple for Red Chips reached 62X by the end of 
10 Fairfield, P., 'P/E, P/B, and the Present Value of Future Dividends' Financial Analysts Journal, July/August 1994, pp. 23-31. 
m ^ m k _ 4 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ h ^ ^ ^ ^ i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ f ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ f ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ f f ^ ! ^ Z ^ ^ _ _ 
1997 (see F igu re 6) , d o w n f r o m the mid-yea r h igh o f 126X. F o r s o m e p o w e r M 
Ch ina -backed u p companies，such as Ch ina Eve rb r igh t Techno logy Ltd . and Ch ina 
Eve rb r igh t In ternat ional Ltd.，their 视 ra t ios w e r e 8 7 5 X and 2 4 4 X respectively. T h e 
marke t is pay ing a p r e m i u m fo r the va lue o f Gnarvci (關係 )” and the potent ia l asset 
inject ions. Asse t in jec t ions t end t o lower t he V/E mul t ip le and jus t i fy toher pr ice 
appreciat ion. Asse t in jec t ions m u s t b e d o n e wel l b e l o w marke t pr ices fo r rece iv ing 
c o m p a n y t o benef i t . A f t e r this initial response， investors (especial ly t h o s e small retail 
inves tors w h o are not qui te famil iar w i t h s tock va lua t ion) s imply chase t he R e d Ch ips 
fo r t he potent ial asset in jec t ions , w h i c h has resul ted in t he crea t ion of t he Ch ina 
Concep t mirac le - T h e P / E of R e d Chips w a s dr iven u p t o absurd level. M o s t R e d 
Ch ips wil l f m d it increasingly di f f icul t t o source t he large-scale deals tha t jus t i fy their 
p r e m i u m rating. H o w e v e r , focus ing o n 视 mul t ip les a lone is mis leading. Pas t 
p e r f o r m a n c e d o e s not demons t ra te f u t u r e earning potentials . 
^ ^ P 5 ) f , S : ¥ > i r i c e E a m i B g » — ^ f U s t e d Compawies 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ E 
i m “ ~ ~ ™ “ ~ ^ M ^ 
_ ^ ^ ^ ^ M 
” Means relationship 
Different Aspects of Red Chips and H Shares 
Even if Red Chips and H Shares are all China related companies listed on the 
Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. They are different in many ways: 
Table 1: Number of shares and Market Capitalization of Red Chips and H Shares 
No. of Market Cap. 
Companies (HK$m) 




Red Chips 36 
H Shares 39 
Source: Datastream 







The Red Chips outweigh H Shares in terms of importance. Furthermore, the 
average size of Red Chips is 4X the size of the average ofH Shares (see Table 1). The 
possible explanation is that investors have high expectations' for earnings prospects of 
Red Chips and are willing to pay a premium. 
















* CSRC - China Securities Regulatory Commission 
Source: Goldman Sachs. 









Furthermore, Red Chips are thought to be more transparent and accountable to 
investors than H-shares. Managements of Red Chips have more flexibility and 
considerable latitude in operating their businesses versus the state-owned H Shares. 
Thus, Red Chips are believed to be better investment tools than H Shares. In fact, Red 
Chips are far more effective in raising capital than H Shares. They are well supervised 
by the Hong Kong regulatory bodies, with more reliable accounting systems and 
stronger protection of minority shareholders' interest. 13 
On the contrary, H Shares still have state-owned enterprise problems. They are 
exposed to the inefficiency of a command economy which can be characterized by 
bureaucracy, lack of operational freedom and well-defined lines of authority. 
Accountancy standards can be ambiguous. In addition, H Shares' fortunes are still 
dictated by Beijing's policies, business decisions may not based on economic 
considerations, but to fulfill political targets. Those political targets may include the 
remedy of the unemployment rate, the privatization or taking over poorly operated 
State Owned Enterprises, etc. One example is that Tsingtao Brewery had to take over 
several near- insolvent breweries and helped them reconstruct their businesses. No 
matter how good or bad the result will be, the target companies are reluctant to decline 
what is suggested by the Central Government. Clearly, H shares are more restricted in 
decision making. 
13 Cheung, Johnson. "Red-Chip Survey· Hong Kong Research, Goldman Sachs, 27 Jun 97. 
Section 2.2: Red Chips 
In this section, we will examine Red Chips, how they originated (whether via 
public listing or backdoor listing), their spectacular rise in valuations and the 
importance of Guanxi for acquiring cheap assets from parent companies (asset 
injection). 
Background 
Red Chips are companies controlled by mainland Chinese entities, which infuse 
their HK-Listed units with cheap assets. 14 Red Chips made their first entrance into the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange back in the early 1990s without much international 
recognition. It has been only since mid-1996, following a number of asset injections, 
that they have caught the attention of the international investors. Prior to this, Red 
Chips were of interest only to dedicated China funds and other specific institutional 
investors. 15 
The Hang Seng China-Affiliated Corporations Index (HSCCI)16 
The Hang Seng China-Affiliated Corporations Index (HSCCI) is a market 
capitalization weighted index for Red Chips. It is comprised of 36 stocks (as at year 
end 1997) . listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange which have at least 35% of their 
shareholdings held directly or indirectly, by state-owned organizations or provincial 
14 Du Bois, Peter C. ·Red-Chip Mania Sweeps Hong Kong, Wfth China Stoking the Flames.· Barron's Market Week, Vol. 77, Issue 21 , pp MW8. 
15 Lo, Marvin & Chan, Edward. ·The Second Encounter of the Third Kind· China-Related Companies, Amsteel Research (HK) Ltd, 14 Qct 1997. 
18 Information provided by HSI Services Limited 
j^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^i^^^f^^^^^::^^^^!l^!^^^!!! : :15!"!:! ! - ^ 
and munic ipa l authori t ies in China . 
r^]^^^l^t^nn F o r m u l a  
Current Aggregate Market 
Current VahieofConstituentStock^ ^ Yesterday�Closing Index 
Index ~ 7 
Yesterday's Closing Aggregate 
Market Value of Constituent Stoc^ ——__ 
T h e H S C C I w a s first l aunched on 16 June 1997 and w a s backda ted to 4 January 
1993 wi th a base va lue of 1,000. It compr ises of n ine const i tuent s tocks o n the base 
date.i7 These s tocks should have b e e n listed for at least 12 mon ths on T h e S tock 
E x c h a n g e of H o n g K o n g and have a t rading record of at least 12 months under t he 
control o f t h e Chinese entities. They can b e H o n g K o n g or overseas incorpora ted , bu t 
mus t no t b e const i tuent s tock o f t h e H a n g Seng Ch ina Enterpr i ses Index ( H S h a r e s ) ^ 
AS ment ioned earlier, th ree R e d Chips are also included as the const i tuents o f H a n g 
Seng i n d e x ¢181) due the growing impor tance o f R e d Chips on the H o n g K o n g s tock 
market，combined wi th actively t rading and heavy capital ization. 
In fact , t w o m o r e companies w i th s t rong China relat ionship, C I T I C Paci f ic and 
China Telecom, are included in H a n g Seng Index Const i tuents . B u t since they are not 
perfect ly me t wi th H S C C F s const i tuent requirement (i.e. C ITIC Paci f ic does not fulf i l l 
the 3 5 % stake holding by China entity and China Telecom w a s listed on the Stock 
Exchange o f H o n g K o n g less than one year) , will no t b e included in this study. 
~ " ： ； ； " ^ ^ 
and Union Bank 
18 Source: HSI Services Limited 
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Market Capitalization 
E a c h o f t h e cons t i tuent s tocks o f t h e H S C C I is w e i g h t e d so tha t it wil l i n f l u e n c e 
t h e index in p ropor t ion t o its respec t ive m a r k e t value. A t t h e year end 1997，the marke t 
capi ta l izat ion o f t h e 36 R e d Ch ips r eached H K $ 1 9 1 . 6 bi l l ion. All R e d Ch ips toge the r 
accoun ted fo r 6<>/o o f t h e total marke t capi ta l izat ion in H o n g Kong，up f o r m 2 . 8 2 % at 
t h e year end 1993 ( refer t o Table 1). H S C C I is domina t ed b y a f e w C o n g l o m e r a t e 
En te rp r i ses and P rope r ty & O>nst rue t ion companies . T h e largest six c o m p a n i e s had 
al ready accoun t s m o r e than 5 0 % o f t h e marke t capi ta l izat ion o f H S C C I , namely: C h i n a 
R e s o u r c e s Ente rpr i se L td . (13 .99%) , Shanghai Indust r ia l H o l d i n g s Ltd . (12.59<¼), 
C P S C O Pac i f i c L td . (6.740/0), G u a n g d o n g Inves tmen t Ltd . (6 .41%)，China Over seas 
L a n d & Inves tmen t Ltd . ( 6 .35%) and Ch ina M e r c h a n t s H o l d i n g s ( Internat ional) Co. 
L td . (6 .21%). Indica t ing are tha t t he pr ice m o v e m e n t of these f e w s tocks wil l 
s ignif icant ly a f fec t t he p e r f o r m a n c e o f H S C C I . 
neEi^^^^^^^B^^^^^^^h^^^^^^^^^^[ti^^^^:^^!^^f^^"f""^l^^:^^"f^ - ~ 
HSCCI 
Current Value (December 31, 1997) 1 J 4 5 . 6 2 
B a s e V a l u e ( J a n u a r y 4 , 1993) 1000 
N o . o f s t o c k s 36 
F i g u r e 7: HSCCT W e i g h t i n 2 ^ Q e c e m b e r 31，1997) 
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Listing Methods 
Red-chips come into the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong generally through two 
ways - Initial Publ ic Offer ings (n>Os) or backdoor listings 
Tnitial Public Offer ings O P O S � 
Initial Public Offering (H>0) is the traditional way of a company to sell common 
stock to the public for the first time^' and grant the listing position on the stock market. 
N e w EPOs o f R e d Chips are considered to be higher-quality companies since they 
have been investigated by Hong K o n g ' s Listing Commit tee and may also be endorsed 
by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). But they cannot diverge 
from their fundamental business or raise new capital within six months of listing^^ 
Table 3.2 shows the Red Chips listed on The Stock Exchange o f H o n g Kong through 
n>os. 
Rackdoor listings 
Backdoor listing means that the mainland shareholder acquires majority shares of 
a listed shell company (relatively small and poorly performing company) and then 
gradually replaces the original assets and activities with its own. 
Backdoor listings are generally more convenient, allowing the acquirer to skip the 
stringent and t ime-consuming JPO process. N o wonder half of the Red Chips 
companies went public on Hong Kong stock market through backdoor listing. 
Encouraged by the successful experimental listing of Guangdong Investment Ltd., 
« Reilly, Frank K. Investment Analysis and Portfolio Manaoement. The Dryden Press, 4th Edition. 1994, p.86 
20 Cheung, Johnson. 'Red-Chip Survey. HongKongResgarch, Goldman Sachs, 27 Jun 97. 
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backdoor listing activities burst during 1993 and 1994 (see Table 3.1). Furthermore， 
share prices of ten soared as retail investors rushed in to chase the stocks. Even though 
the real earning growth or management reconstruction was not demonstrated right after 
taken over，investors were speculating on the China "concept" and the potential asset 
injection. However , on 20 June l997 , the State Council announced new guidelines on 
China owned companies in which back door listing on the H o n g Kong stock market 
through acquiring shell companies is prohibited. Existing back door listed Red Chips 
are thus better off. 
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Tah1p .^1 Rackdoor Listings of Red ChiPS 
Company Name Date Sector Shell Company  
SHENYIN W A N G U O Nov-96 Bank andFinace Shanghai Int'l (HK) Ltd 
SHOUGANG CCRD.CEN.HDG, Jan-95 Industrial Easterb Century Holdings Ltd. 
CHINA EVERBRIGHT Nov-94 ConglomerateEnterprise IHD Holdings 
CNPC HONG KONG Oct-94 Oil & Mining Paragon Holdings Ltd. 
SHOUGANG CCRD.TECH,HDG. Oct-94 Electric & Electronics Santai Manufacturing Ltd 
CHINA EVERBRIGHT TECH. May-94 Electric & Electronics Han Wah Holdings Ltd. 
SHENZHEN INTL.HDG. Apr-94 Property & Construction Innovisions Ltd, 
TOP GLORY INTERNATIONAL Feb-94 ConglomerateEnterprise Word Trade Centre Group Ltd. 
CHINAFOODS Jan-94 Industrial Seabase Int'l Ltd • 
CHINA EVERBRIGHT INTL. Oct-93 ConglomerateEnterprise Newfound Land M'\ Co. Ltd. 
ONFEM HOLDINGS Oct-93 Oil & Mining Law's Property Holdings Ltd 
POLYINVESTMENTHDG. Oct-93 ConglomerateEnterprise LdlimanHoldingsLtd 
SHOUGANG CCRD.GRD.GP. Sep-93 Property & Construction Kader Inv. Co, 
CHINA AEROSPACE Jul-93 Industrial ConicInvestmentCo.Ltd, 
SHOUGANG CCRDJNTL.ENTS. Jul-93 Property & Construction Tung Wing Steel Holdings Ltd. 
CHINA RES.ENTREP, Sep-92 Property&Constmction Strong Foundation Dev. Ltd 
GUANGDONG INY. Jul-88 Property&Construction Union Globe Dev, Ltd 
MINXIN HDG. ‘ Jul-88 iBai^andFinace |PaninHoldingsLtd.  
T^^e. ^ 7 Tnitia1 Publir Offering OPO) T ^^ tinp of Red ChiPS 
Company Name ListingDate Sector 
SHAI.INDUSTRIAL May-96 Conglomerate Enterprise 
FOUNDER HONG KONG Dec-95 Electric & Kectronics 
NG FUNG HONG Oct-95 Trading 
COSCO P A C M C Dec-94 Transportation 
ORIENTALMETALSHDG. Dec-94 Trading 
GUANGNAN HOLDINGS Dec-94 Trading 
CHINA PHARMACEUTICAL Jun-94 Industnal 
LEGEND HOLDINGS Feb-94 Industrial 
G Z m C HUALING HDGS Dec-93 Industrial 
STONE ELECTRONIC TECH. Aug-93 Electric & Elec_ics 
DENWAY INV, Feb-93 Industrial 
GUANGZHOU INV. Dec-92 Property & Construction 
CHINA TRAVEL INTL, Nov-92 Conglomerate Enterprise 
CHINA OS.LAND & INV- Aug-92 Property & Construction 
CHINAMRCH.HOLDINGS Jul-92 |ConglomerateEnterprise 
T^^e. 13 More tban ^5% shares hn1d bv Mi\m]^ r\d Authoritv 
Compnay Name Date Sector 
CONT.MARE^R 93, Transportation 
UNION BANK OF HONG KONG 92' Bank and Finance 
K A W A H B A N K 86' |BankandFinance 
Source: Wardley Cardex 
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Main Features ofRed Chips 
Both red-chip companies and their controlling shareholders hold considerable 
business interests in China. These enterprises may own substantial assets in China and 
Hong Kong. To understand the background of their major shareholders could be as 
equal important as their fundamental analysis.^^ 
Qiianxi Tssues 
Influence and Guami are critical for doing business in China - especially true 
since China still operates a centralized economic system. Mos t Red Chips ' parents 
have strong backgrounds including state-owned enterprises, central government 
ministries，provincial or municipal authorities. They are so powerful and report directly 
to the State Counci l . ' ' Some Red Chips are even the window companies o f t h e Chinese 
Government, such as Shanghai Industrial Ltd., and the potential Red Chip, Beij ing 
Enterprise Ltd. (At present，the company does not meet the requirement of one year 
listing). These companies tend to count more on their political connections to attract 
investors, rather than through any solid asset restructuring. In fact, the H>0 o f B e i j i n g 
Enterprise raised a record of 1,276X^^ oversubscription, reflecting investors ' fanaticism 
over the "China Concept". 
Guanxi grants Red Chips advantages in doing business, either through acquiring 
assets and resources cheaper and faster or confer the companies with special franchises. 
The China Travel International Investment H K Ltd. is well known for its leading 
21 «22 Cheung, Johnson. "Red-Chip Survey' Hong Kong Research, Goldman Sachs. 27 Jun 97. 
23 'China: Growing pains', ABN AMRO China Research. Feb 1998, p.15. 
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position in developing the tourism and transport business in China because of its 
special Guanxi^ In addition, the concurrent take-over activities of the China 
Everbright group to acquire stake in local blue chips companies, such as Hongkong 
Telecom，are supported by China ' s Government . 
The China Guami obviously becomes an intangible asset to Red Chips. What 
investors pay for Red Chips are not only the assets o f t h a t companies, but also this 
Guarm privilege yet to be realized in earning growth in the future. 
However , in the longer term, companies cannot survive solely depends on Guami. 
Strong Gnanxi does help business operations in certain ways, but as the market is 
increasingly transparent and globalized, inefficient organizations would no longer exist. 
Guami adds value to a company，but will never be the core factor ofsuccess . 
Asset Tnjection 
The magic o f a s s e t injection has ever been the major motive to "Red Chip fever". 
Prior to the June 30 handover o f H o n g Kong to Beijing, owning shares in a Red Chip 
seemed a license to print money. After setting up shop in Hong Kong, a Red Chip 
would typically snap up state-owned assets on the cheap hoping to tun big profits once 
they were restructured. The promise of such asset injections drove Red Chip ' s 
valuations to 'ridiculous levels.^^ 
狄 Cheung, Johnson. 'Red-Chip Survey" Hong Kong Research, Goldman Sachs, 27 Jun 97. 
25 Einhom, Bruce & Capell，Kerry. 'A Red Flag for Red-Chip Stocks' Business Week. Issue 3551.3 Nov 1997. pp. 49. 
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Experiencing various miraculous rises in share prices, investors were ecstatic over 
any potential asset injection of Red Chips. Even a rumour was sufficient enough to 
drive up the share price. It was not a surprise that share prices doubled or tripled in a 
short period. Sometimes, prices moved over 50% up / down within one day. The 
typical cases could be the China Everbright Group. 
It was reasonable to believe that the Red Chip companies would acquire quality 
assets from their parent companies at a substantially discounted price. The reason could 
be the majority shareholders personal stake. They were possible to benefit from 
acquiring assets cheap and had their holding shares increase in price. Moreover， 
Chinese government wanted to maintain good reputation in exploring the new capital 
market. 
Investors usually evaluate the size of the asset injection，and the size of the Red 
Chips as well; the smaller the company the larger the impact, and hence the higher the 
increases in share prices. 
However，the asset injection game cannot go on forever. The parent companies 
will run out of attractive assets to inject. The quality of assets will deteriorate, and the 
Chinese government will not always provide a free lunch. The State Council had 
announced guidelines on Red Chips asset injections in which those companies cannot 
inject their mainland assets until three years after the investment are made. A derating 
of some Red Chips would probably fol low and it did, compounded by the recent 
currency crisis. 
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S^pt^nrf 7 1- H Shares 
This section overviews H Shares in terms of valuation and origination 
Background 
H Shares are incorporated in China with their asset and businesses mostly located 
in China. Even though they have obtained listing position on the Stock Exchange of 
Hong Kong, the stock performance depends intensively on the political and economic 
situations，and interest rates in China. As a result, their stock movement could be quite 
different from the broad market o f H o n g Kong. 
The Hang Seng China Enterprises Index (HSCEI) ^^  
The Hang Seng China Enterprises Index ^ i S C E I ) is a market capitalization 
weighted index comprised of 39 stocks (as at year ended 1997) listed on the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange. It serves as an indicator of the stock price performance o f t h o s e 
Hong Kong-listed PRC companies — H shares. Through it, investors and analysts can 
trace the overall market performance o f t h e s e companies while being provided with a 
common point of reference. 
28 Information provided by HSI Services Limited. 
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r^1r.ii1ation Formula 
Current Aggregate Market 
Current Value of Constituent Stocks 
Index = X Yesterday's Closing Index 
Yesterday's Closing Aggregate 
Market Value ofConstituent Stocks 
The H S C E I was first published on 8 August 1994 with a base value of 1,000 set 
on 8 July 1994; it comprises o f t e n constituent stocks on the base date. The Index senes 
is backdated to 15^ July 1993 when the first China enterprise, Tsintao Brewery Co. 
Ltd., was primary listed on the SEHK. 
Market Capitalization 
At year ended 1997, market capitalization o f t h e 39 H Shares surged to HK$48 
billion. All H Shares together accounted for 1.5% o f t h e total market capitalization in 
Hong Kong, up form 0.67% at the year ended 1993. The constituents for the H S C E I 
have increased over the past few years, f rom one on 15 July 1993 to 39 by the end of 
1997. Recent data shows that the increasing number o f H Shares results in dropping 
weight and reducing sensitivity of individual H Shares on the HSCEI. While Beij ing 
Datang Power accounted for 10.58% o f t h e weight in the index, all other individual H 
share companies constitute less than 10%. 
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Current Value (December 31, 1997) 722.99 
Base Value (July 8，1994) 1000 
No. o f s t o c k s 39 
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Listing Aspects 
China ' s Open Door policy began in 1978. The country is running towards its 
modernization targets. Yet o f t h e total number of340，000 state owned enterprises，45% 
o f t h e m are still operating at a loss. The reform of state owned enterprises has long 
become the Chinese government ' s major economic concern. The country cannot 
always subsidize the poor performing state owned enterprises. Three basic principles 
are being adopted to remedy the situation. 
1. M e r g i n g , s e c u r i t i e s , o r p a r t l y s o l d o u t . This policy is applied to those large to 
medium enterprises which engaged in key industries such as national defense, 
banking and finance and advanced technologies. 
2. Sales to employees. For that small size firm，the equity will be sold to its 
employees or foreign investors. 
3 Bankruptcies. Unmanageable organizations cannot survive. 
Reform takes t ime and leads to massive layoffs. Better ways would be to induce 
foreign investments which would also stimulate economic growth. Followed by Deng 
Xiaoping,s trip to the South the Summer of 1982, the reformation and modernization 
gained new momentum. Overseas listing, such as the launching o f H Shares, was thus 
initiated. 
As look into Table 4, the first H share began trading on the Stock Exchange of 
Hong Kong in July 93. Followed by f lood of other China enterprises. The overseas 
listing o f H shares was most active during the first three quarters 1997，whereas the 
market was extremely bullish. 
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y^h]e 4: H Share Listings 
StockName ListingDate [Sector • 
GUANGZHOU PHARM. 'H SHARES' 30-Oct-97 Chemical 
ANHUI CONCH 'H' 21-Oct-97 Building Materials & Basic Metals 
CHONG QING IRON & STEEL "H' 17-Oct-97 Building Materials & Basic Metals 
SICHUAN EXPRESSWAY 丑 SHARES' 7-Oct-97 Infrastructure 
CATIC SHENZHEN 'H' 29-Sep-97 CapitalGoods 
ANGANG N E W STEEL 'H' SHARES 24-Jul-97 Building Materials & Basic Metals 
CHINASTHN.AIRL. 'H' 3-Jul-97 Infrastructure 
JIANGSU EXPRESSWAY 'H SHARES' 27-Jun-97 Infrastructure 
BEIJING YANHUA 'H SHARES' 25-Jun-97 Chemical 
FIRST TRACTOR 'H SHARES' 23-Jun-97 Capital Goods 
JIANGXI COPPER 'H SHARES' 12-Jun-97 Building Materials k Basic Metals 
ZHEJIANG EXPRESSWAY CO ’H SHARES' 15-May-97 Infrastructure 
BEIJING NORTH STAR CO. 'H SHARES' 14-May-97 Consumption / Service 
BEIJING DATANG POWER 'H SHARES' 21-Mar-97 Infrastructure 
SHENZHEN EXPRESSWAY 'H SHARES' 12-Mar-97 Infrastructure 
CfflNA EASTERN AIRLINES 'H SHARES' 5-Feb-97 Infrastructure 
SHANDONG XINHUA PHARM. 'H SHARES' 31-Dec-96 Chemical 
ANHUI EXPRESSWAY CO. 'H SHARES' 13-Nov-96 Infrastructure 
GUANGDONG KELON 'H-SHARES' 23-Jul-96 Capital Goods 
GUANGSHEN RAILWAY ’H SHARES' 14-May-96 Infrastructure 
NANJING PANDA 'H SHARES' 2-May-% Capital Goods 
JINGWEI TEXTILE MACHINE 'H SHARES' 2-Feb-96 Capital Goods 
NORTH EAST ELEC. 'H SHARES' 6-Jul-95 Capital Goods 
JILIN CHEMICAL IND. 'H SHARES' 23-May-95 Chemical 
HARBIN POWER EQUIPMENT 'H SHARES' 16-Dec-94 Capital Goods 
CHENGDU TELECOM.CABLE 'H SHARES' 13-Dec-94 Capital Goods 
ZHENHAI REFN. & CHM, 'H SHARES' 2-Dec-94 Chemical 
CHINA SHIPPING DEV. 'H SHARES' 1 l-Nov-94 Infrastructure 
QINGLING MOTORS 'H SHARES' 17-Aug-94 Capital Goods 
LUOYANG GLASS 'H SHARES' 8-Jul-94 Building Materials & Basic Metals 
DONG FANG ELECT.MCH. 'H SHARES' 6-Jun-94 Capital Goods 
TIANJIN BOHAI CHM. 'H SHARES' 17-May-94 Chemical 
YIZHENG CHM.HBRE 'H SHARES' 29-Mar-94 Chemical 
MAANSHAN IRON & STL. 'H SHARES' 3-Nov-93 Building Matenals & Basic Metals 
BEIREN PRINTING 'H SHARES' 6-Aug-93 Consumption / Service 
GUANGZHOU SfflP. 'H SHARES' 6-Aug-93 Capital Goods 
SHANGHAI PETROCHEM. 'H SHARES' 26-Jul-93 Chemical 
TSINGTAO BREWERY 'H SHARES' 14>Jul-93 Consumption / Service 
KUNMING MACHINE ^  SHARES' 12-Jul-93 ICapital Goods  
Source: Wardley Cardex 
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Main Features ofH Shares 
Management Tssues 
As discussed earlier, the driven element for launching H shares being the 
incapable management of state owned enterprises. Yet H shares provide direct access 
to China investment opportunities, the management problem still exits. Inter 
company debt piled up and went unsett led，while accounting and disclosure 
requirement are not abided by. Investors may even be shocked by the misapplication of 
raised funds. The mainland companies claiming to raise funds overseas often don ' t 
realize the rules of shareholder capitalism. Even Tsingtao Brewery Co, one of the 
eminent H Shares，had been suspended trading for one day because it lent much o f i t s 
proceeds to other mainland companies instead of expanding existing plants. 
Chjna Factors 
Investors must be aware that H Shares are greatly influenced by the Mainland 
policies. While Chinese government intends to adopt a more open and transparent 
economic policy, the mechanism is not mature at present. China, to a great extent, is 
still a planned economy. Input costs and selling prices may be fixed at uneconomic 
rates. There is also exchange control, and unexpected policy promulgation may hamper 
the business operation. For example, the introduction of austerity measures in later half 
of 1993 ruined the economic development and hence led to depressed share prices. 
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CHAPTER III 
RlSK AND RETURN CHARACTERISTICS 
The previous chapter gives a general impression of the characteristics of the 
Hong Kong Red Chips and H Shares. This chapter will be divided into two 
sections，with the first section defining risk and return as well as how investors 
typically prefer to increase return while minimizing risk. The following section 
describes the use ofbeta and simple regression to measure risk and return in this 
study. We also outlining the minimization of risk by diversifying away 
unsystematic risk. 
Section 3.1 • T .iterature Review 
A rational investor normally prefers high re tum for less risk. W h e n choosing 
between the investments with the same level of risk, investor would prefer high retum; 
and i f t h e investments generate the same return, investor would prefer the one with less 
risk. When investigating the performance of an investment，the two dimensional 
aspects o f r e t u r n and its associated risk must be taken into account. 
Measurement ofRisk 
Risk could be defined as the probability of an adverse outcome. There was no 
specific measure for risk until the 1950s. The basic portfolio model was developed by 
Markowitz (1952), who derived the expected rate of return for a portfolio o f a s s e t s and 
an expected risk measure. It was proved that the variance of the rate of return was a 
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meaningful measure o f p o r t f o l i o risk. Thereafter, the variance, or standard deviation of 
expected re tums becomes the common way to measure risk. 
Investors generally regard a stock with larger price fluctuations within a short 
period o f t i m e as risky and a stock with smaller price fluctuations as stable or less risky. 
Price fluctuation is a measurement of risk (variance / standard deviation). Greater 
price changes tend to increase the chance for the return to deviate from the expected 
return. The future price o f a h i g h l y fluctuating stock tends to be less predictable, and as 
a result，investors in this stock are taking greater chances, hence greater potential 
returns.. 
Systematic anH Non-svstematic Risks 
Stock investors are actually facing two types of risk - the systematic risk (market 
portion) and the non-systematic risk (individual portion). The non-systematic risk 
arises from the company specific or industry specific factors such as changes in 
management and the financial policies of the company. With a fully diversified 
portfolio, however, the non-systematic risks for stocks in the portfolio tend to cancel 
each other out. Systematic risk arises from the market-wide factors which affect most 
stocks in the market and cannot be eliminated through diversification^^. 
Risk-Return Relationship 
Markowitz (1952) laid down the foundation of modem portfolio management in 
which Sharpe, Lintner and Mossin developed the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
independently. CAPM, known as the Sharpe-Lintner model, is a theory about the way 
泣 Mok, Henry, M. K. & Lam, Kin. & Cheung, Iris, Y.K. "An Exploration on Risk and Return of Hong Kong Stocks' The Securities Journal. Feb 
1990.pp. 17. 
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Stocks are priced in relat ion to their risk. It is employed in a lmost all empir ical studies 
investigating issues such as the relat ionship be tween risk and return, the existence o f 
abnormal returns (event studies)，and in determining “fair，，returns for regulated 
industries. In most studies a posi t ive and signif icant relationship be tween the ex-post 
mean re turn and the corresponding risk index (beta) is found?" 
Through making a number o f a s s u m p t i o n s , a posit ive linear relat ionship be tween 
a s tock ' s expected returns and is be ta values is derived. In other words，when plot ted in 
the beta-return space, a straight line wi th upward slope would emerge. 
^^ta as a m^^^ure nf Svstematic Risk 
The posit ive and significant f inding enhances the role of C A P M ^nd presumable 
has convinced professional investors to employ beta as the appropriate risk index. Be ta 
is reported by numerous institutional investors, such as Value Line，Standard and Poors , 
and Merri l l Lynch>^ El ton and Gruber shared the similar point of v iew (1987). F r o m 
casual observat ion of s tock prices, they found that when the market goes u p (as 
measured by any of the widely available s tock market indexes)，most stocks tend to 
increase in price, and w h e n the market goes down, most stocks tend to decrease in 
price. This suggests that one reason security returns might be correlated is because of a 
c o m m o n response t o market changes, and a useful measure of this correlation is 
suggested by relating the return on a stock to the return on a stock market index. 
Sharpe ' s Marke t Mode l (Sharpe, 1963) is commonly used to capture a s tock 's 
price movement and risk. This market model takes a single market index as a proxy for 
28 Levy, H. 'Risk and Return: An Experimental Analysis' International Economic Review, Vol 38, No.1 ’ Feb 1997’ pp. 119-145. 
29 prakash, A. J., Parhizgari. A. M., and Perritt, G. W., "The Effect of Listing on the Parameters of Characteristic Lines Models". Journal of 
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the market influence. It decomposes the 产 s tock 's return (Rit) into two components: 
Rit= ai+yS,RMt + ett……(1) 
Stock's Return = Performance related to broad market + Individual portion 
The first is a systematic component which measures the performance o f t h e stock 
in responds to the broad market, which is equal to /5 i t imes the return on the market 
portfolio (RMt). The second component is the individual portion of the s tock 's return 
that is independent o f t h e market ' s performance. This component can then be divided 
into an expected portion ( a d and a random portion ( e ^) in Equation (1). In fact, this 
non-systematic risk can be eliminated through diversification. 
Beta measures the expected change in the s tock 's return per one per cent change 
in the re tum on the market portfolio. The market beta equals one and stocks with betas 
larger (smaller) than one are regarded as more (less) risky than the overall market. 
Stocks with beta values greater than one are termed aggressive. They tend to rise (fall) 
at a faster rate than the average stock during up (down) market. Stocks with beta values 
less than one are termed defensive. Their prices tend to rise (fall) at a slower rate than 
the average stock in up (down) markets. However, this relation does not always held as 
the underlying company may have structural or other changes which may affect the 
earning potential，in which the stock is possible move in a completely opposite 
direction from its past relation with the market. 
Business Finance&Accounting, 16(3) Summer 1989. 
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The total risk of a stock can be broken down into two components: 
V a r ( R , t ) = 3 i ' V a r ( R M t ) + V a r ( e « ) … … ( 2 ) 
Total Risk = Systematic risk + Unsystematic risk 
The first component is the systematic risk and the second component，the non-
systematic risk. The beta coefficient links the risk of a stock with that of the whole 
broad market. The larger the s tock 's beta, the larger its systematic risk. Beta is a direct 
measure o f t h e systematic risk of a stock. 
Siy^tematic Risk Relative to Overall Risk 
Equation (1) postulates a linear relation between Ri,andRMt. By applying least 
squares method to estimate the parameters in Equation (1), the slope of the regression 
line as an estimate for the beta coefficient o f t h e stock is formed. From this regression 
analysis, the total variation represents the overall risk, i.e.Var(RJ in Equation (2), the 
explained variation corresponds to the systematic risk (undiversifiable market risk) and 
the unexplained variation, the non-systematic risk (diversifiable individual risk). 
Consequently, the coefficient ofdeterminat ion, R ' o f t h e least squares procedure can be 
interpreted as the proportion o f t o t a l risk that is systematic, or the percentage of risk 
that cannot be eliminated by diversification. To put it in another way, l - R ' is the 
proportion of total risk that is non-systematic which can be eliminated through 
diversification. 
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Since non-systematic risk can be eliminated through diversification, investors 
would not be rewarded for bearing this part of risk but be rewarded for bearing 
systematic risk. Hence, higher systematic risk is expected to generate a higher return. 
Since systematic risk is now measured by the betas, a linear positive risk-return 
relationship is translated into a positive beta-return relationship. 
Criticisms on Beta Estimations 
Such a beta-return relationship of the C A P M has been subjected to numerous 
empirical studies since the general equilibrium C A P M was developed in the 1960's. 
However, many estimations o f b e t a were ‘rolled over，by Roll (1977) who argued that 
only i f t h e beta is computed by using an efficient market portfolio is the return on an 
asset of portfolio an exact linear relation of beta. Otherwise, beta is not an 
unambiguous measure of risks. It fol lows that beta values are very sensitive to the 
choice market p roxy?� 
Recent studies have also cast doubt on the stationarity of individual security betas 
as it was found that betas in one period different substantially from their values in a 
previous period (e.g. Bey 1983; Chen and Lee 1982). Previous research done on the 
betas of Hong Kong securities also questioned their stationarity and applications in 
general，see for example Wan (1980) and Ip (1982). The non-stationarity o f b e t a values 
is possible threat to the beta-return relation. Stationarity and predictability of beta are 
beyond the scope o f t h i s article，but interested readers are referred to the paper by Lam， 
M o k and Cheng(1982)^^ . Although the prediction of security beta is associated with 
^ Mok, Henry, M. K. & Lam, Kin. & Cheung, Iris, Y.K, 'An Exploration on Risk and Return of Hong Kong Stocks" The Securities Journal, Feb 
1990, pp. 17. 
31 Lam, Kin Henry M.K. Mok, iris Cheng 'Predictability and the Stationarity ofBeta. Coefficients ofHong Kong Securities" Proceedings : 
International Symposium on Pacific Asian Business, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA Vol 3 (Jan) 1990, pp.115-117 
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large variability, the prediction of portfolio beta is more accurate. That is why in 
investigating the beta-return relationship, portfolios should be considered. 
Portfolio Beta 
Despite criticism on the securities' estimated betas and the models used to 
estimate them，past research conceded that quite an accurate and stationary beta 
estimate could be obtained from a diversified portfolio. Errors in estimating individual 
betas will cancel each other out when they are combined to from a portfolio. 
Section 3.2 Methodology 
To capture a stock's price movements and risk, Sharpe 's Market Model (Sharpe, 
1963) is commonly used (as in M o k 1992, for example). This study attempts to 
determine the return correlation of investment in the Red Chips and H Shares risk with 
the broader market performance o f H o n g Kong.. 
This market model takes a single market index as a proxy for the market 
influence.32 Thus, All Ordinary Index (AOI) would be used as a proxy for the market 
influence. Applying AOI as the market proxy has the advantage over the Hang Seng 
Index since AOI counts all stocks listed in Hong Kong, including the Red Chips and H 
Shares, thus eliminating the relevancy problem. Therefore AOI is representative by the 
overall market. 
32 Mok, Henry M. K., Kin Lam, Y. K., Kin Lam, Y. K. Cheung. 'An Exploration on Risk and Return ofHong Kong Stocks； The Securities Journal, 
Feb. 1990, pp. 1-16. 
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AllOrdinaries Mdex^^  
The All Ordinaries Index (AOI) is market value-weighted index which includes 
all the ordinary shares listed on the Exchange since 1 February 1989. The base index of 
AOI is 1000 as a t t h e close o f 2 April 1986. 
Calculation Formula 
Current Aggregate Market 
Current Value of Constituent Stocks 
Index = X Yesterday's Closing Index 
Yesterday's Closing Aggregate  
Market Value ofConstituent Stocks  
The basic methodology of this study involves the use of the Sharpe 's Market 
M o d e l Where: 
Ri t = a i + i8 iRMt + e t t 
Rrt = the daily return of stock i at t ime t, 
RMt = the daily returns o f t h e All Ordinary Index (AOI) 
a, = E ( % ) - ^ i E ( R M t ) 
where: E is the expected portion 
^ 1 = beta 
£ ^ - stochastic error term (random portion) 
33 Information provide by the HSI Services Ltd. 
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T h e daily re turns o f s tocks are used in the analysis. M o r e specifically, the da ta 
type col lected for the t^ daily c losing pr ice o f t h e 产 s tock P , is the defaul t pr ice that 
have ad jus ted fo r subsequent capital act ion such as cash dividends，capital changes， 
bonus issues，rights issues, splitting, etc. The s tock ' s daily re turn Ri^  = In (P^ 丨 Pit-i)- The 
re turn on the marke t p roxy，R_ at day t，then，is measured by R g t = In ( A O ; / A O I ( . ) 
B e t a coeff ic ient fo r the 产 s tock is compu ted by regress ing R ^ u p o n Ryt 
All the const i tuent s tocks o f t h e H S C C I and H S C E I w e r e included in th is study.， 
as o f 3 1 D e c e m b e r 1997. There are total ly 36 H S C C I const i tuents (Red Chips) and 
39 H S C E I ( H Shares). The s tudy per iod w a s from 1 January 1993 to 31 D e c e m b e r 
1997. To see h o w the risk and r e t u m of s tocks changed over t ime, the who le s tudy 
per iod w a s fur ther b roken d o w n into t en bi-yearly subperiods. 
In order to reduce the bias or meaningless result genera ted from the infrequent ly 
t raded stocks, be ta of some inact ive s tocks will be del iberately deleted for certain 
subperiods and / or the full period. 93 - 97，i.e. individual s tock ' s bi-yearly turnover 
date less than 110 will b e deleted f r o m that period, or the turnover date less than 1100 
in the full period 93 — 97 will a lso be deleted f r o m the full per iod study. 
Stocks will then be classif ied into different sectors according to their special 
marke t feature. There w e r e eight sectors for R e d Chips: Bank ing and Finance, 
Conglomera te Enterprise，Electronic & Electric，Industrial，Oil and Mining，Property 
and Construct ion, Trading，and Transportation. A s for H Shares, there are only five 
sectors : Bui lding Mater ia ls and Bas ic Metals，Capital Goods , Chemical , Consumpt ion 
/ Service and. Infrastructure. 
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There will be comparison o f b e t a value among the two groups o f s t o c k . After all, 
the total risk o f R e d Chips over the f ive years will be decomposed into systematic and 
non-systematic risk. Whi le this study does not intend to look deep into the matter of 
portfolio selection or diversification，the information of risk component would provide 
investors with a better understanding of Red Chips. H shares will not be included in 
this part of the analysis since they are too new to the market and many of them are 
listed on the Stock Exchange o f H o n g Kong for not more than a few months. 
Data Collection and Empirical Work 
This study is to examine all Red Chips and H Shares quoted on the Stock 
Exchange o f H o n g Kong, covering for the period between January 1993 and December 
1997. Daily stock price and All Ordinary Index (AOI) f igure were collected and then 
processed for the performance analysis. Electronic data is collected f rom Datastream, 
while companies ' background information was referred to Wardley Cardex. 
Constraints 
Data covered in this study is up to the year ended 1997 (31 December 1997). 
However, the stock market suffered severely due to the regional currency crisis during 
the 4也 quarter 1997. The beta value shown for this latest period may not represent an 
objective estimation of risk of each stock in related to the market. 
Moreover, most H Shares were listed and started trading in the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange in 1997. The initial period of listing and short term performance, may not 
reflect the true performance of those companies in the longterm. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE RESULTS 
This section summarizes the results of the study. We will look at the results from 
difference aspects. Beginning with a broader overview of the index performance, 
we will then focus down to narrower perspectives such as beta value ofRed Chips 
and H Shares related to the broader market. In addition, we will examine the 
sectoral betas as well as how they changed over the study period. Finally, we will 
decompose the total risk of Red Chips into systematic and non-systematic risk, 
and see to what extend Red Chips could be diversified to reduce risk. 
Section 4 1 Tndex Performance 
Jn this section, there would be a brief discussion on Index performance of 
Red Chips (HSCCI) and H Shares (HKCEI) in the latest years. 
Red chips attracted enormous trading interest back in early 1993.'^ But during 
mid-1993, the development o f C h i n a shares suffered a serious setback as China entered 
into its credit tightening period, following the exorbitant growth experienced over the 
previous two years. The infamous triangular debt issues and credit crunch nakedly 
exposed the environmental weakness of most H Shares. Even today the lingering 
effects have meant that most H Shares have yet to recover basis. Red Chips did not 
34 Lau, K. Y. 'Red Chip Fever' The Securities Journal, June 1997, pp. 42-46. 
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share the same painful experience as their H counterparts.'^ 
The H S C C I outperformed the AOI for the first t ime in late 1996 (as shown in 
F ig . l ) and the premium has continued to widen thereafter despite the recent correction. 
In the first half of 1997, the shoot up o f t h e H S C C I was mainly driven by the asset 
injection activities of the heavy weight Red Chips, such as Shanghai Industrial 
Holdings Limited and China Resources Enterprise Limited. 
In addition, there are many derivatives products on the Red Chips. Despite the 
numerous H o n g Kong Listed warrants, the Red Chips fotures and options began 
trading on 12 September 1997, making the share prices even more volatile and 
sentiment driven. Despite the great drop in return (i.e. 57.5% down from 1997 high, see 
Table 5) aroused by currency crisis. Red Chips, as a whole, still recorded 9.8% return 
in 1997. However, H Shares，as a whole suffered 30 .4% loss in value. 
Tiihlft ^! Tnde^ Pprformanri> nfUed Chips and H Shares  
Fn^-1QQ7 o/n nhar>ge from 
2/1/97 1997 High 31/12/97 2/1/97 1997 High 
HSCCI 1,589.5 4,110.6 1,745.6 9.8 (57.5) 
HSCEI 1,038.6 1,727.0 723.0 (30.4) (58.1) 
Source: ABN A M B O CfflNA RESEARCH  
Notwithstanding, Red Chips and H Shares are growing in importance in Hong 
Kong stock market. As shown in Table 6，the average monthly turnover for Red Chips 
were H K $ 8 billion in 1996, but increased sharply to HK$56.3bill ion in 1997. 
35 Lo, Marvin & Chan, Edward. _The Second Encounter of the Third Kind' China-Related Companies. Amsteel Research (HK) Ltd. 14 Oct 
1997:6 
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Similarly, H Shares ' average monthly turnover was HK$2 billion in 1996 and increased 
dramatically to HK$24.6 billion. 
Tflhle 6! Average Monthlv Turnover —— 
1996 1997 % change 
H S r a ffi^ ^ ^ 607.0 
HSCEI HK$bn 2.0 24.6 1111.4 
Source: ABN A M B O CfflNA RESEARCH 
Section 4 2 Findings on svstematic risks 
In this section we will compare average beta values of Red Chips and H 
Shares over the last four years. As the beta estimated from market model 
regressions would be severely biased ifstocks are trade infrequentlyS6, only stocks 
with reasonably active trading record are included in our discussion. 
(Beta o f inac t ive stocks will be deliberately deleted for certain subperiods and / 
or the full period. 93 - 97，i.e. individual s tock 's bi-yearly turnover date less than 110 
will be deleted f rom that period, or the turnover date less than 1100 in the full period 
93 - 97 will also be deleted from the full period s tudy.) 
Comparison between Red Chips and H Shares 
In analyzing the comovement o f R e d Chips and H Shares in respond to market changes， 
the average beta value to the whole broad market (systematic risk) of Red Chips and H 
Shares are shown in Figure 9. The beta values shown in the graph below 
38 Boabang Francis. "An Adjustment Procedure for Predicting Betas when Thin Trading is Present: Canadian Evidence" Journal of Business 
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representing the average by-yearly beta of all Red Chips and H Shares in the examined 
period. The beta values o f t h e s e two groups of stocks are quite fluctuating. Beta for Red 
Chips varied f rom 0.748 in the first half year of 1994 to 1.644 in the second half year of 
1997. Similarly, H Shares ' beta varies f rom 0.656 in the second half year of 1996. Generally, 
beta value tends to be stable when combining with other stocks in a group. That means the 
beta value for individual Red Chips and H shares would be more volatile. 
W h e n comparing the beta o f t h e Red Chips Stock Average calculated from the chosen 
stocks and that o f H S C C I , w e found that the beta o f t h e HSCCI is consistently higher than 
that o f t h e counterpart. When comparing the beta o f H - s t o c k s Average and that o f H S C E I , 
w e found that the beta HSCEI , w e found that the beta o f H S C E I is also higher than those 
beta from chosen H shares. The market indexes for those particular kinds of stocks show a 
larger value in beta, indicating that the stocks w e chosen is less reactive to the market 
fluctuation than other Red Chips or H shares do. 
Nevertheless, it is apparent that the beta values o f R e d Chips and H Shares were very 
close during the first half year 1994 to the first half year 1996. Looking back into 1994， 
when the development o f C h i n a suffered serious setbacks as discussed earlier, both groups 
thus underperformed the market, implying that the performance o f R e d Chips and H Shares 
are greatly affected by China factors. Later during the whole year of 1997，the average beta 
values o f R e d Chips increased to about 1.5, indicating that the group of stocks became more 
aggressive. Again, the political and China factors seem to had driven the beta value, as 1997 
is the year ofpol i t i ca l handover. Red Chips had privilege of asset injection and o f u n i q u e 
Guanxi o f H o n g Kong with China. H Shares, however, with their operating bases located 
in the Mainland，are not subject to these benefits，appeared largely underperforming the 
market. 
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Individual Red Chips 
Table 7 repor ts t he be tas fo r individual R e d Chips in t he ful l per iod 93 - 97 and 
ten subperiods. These be ta va lues represent t he systemat ic r isk an investor will b e 
taking w h e n invest ing in a single stock. Some s tocks are m o r e aggressive，while the 
others are m o r e defensive. The bi-year ly be ta coeff ic ient range wide ly across all s tocks， 
from a l ow of - 0 .219 (Gzit ic Hau l ing Ho ld ings in later half year of 1995 ) to a h igh of 
2 .499(China M e r c h a n t Hold ings in f irst half of 1997). 
B e t a va lues o f individual s tocks also change substantial ly from one subper iod to 
another. F o r example，China Merchan t has the lowest be ta va lue of 0 .443 in the later 
half 1994，however, its be ta va lue is the highest in the first half year of 1997. W h y 
might observed Be tas in one per iod differ from Be tas in a second per iod? B l u m e (1975) 
and Levy (1971) have done extensive test ing of the relat ionship be tween Be ta s over 
t ime. One reason for this great variat ion in be ta is that the risk of the security might 
change. A second reason is that the B e t a in each per iod is measured wi th a r a n d o m 
error，and the larger the r andom error，the less predict ive power Be t a s from one per iod 
will have to Betas in the next period. 
The f inding reveals the e lus iveness in risk measurement . Pas t data can only tell u s 
the ex-post risk undergone by a stock，which m a y b e dif ferent from ex-ante risk it will 
undergo in a subsequent period. It could be diff icult to predict the individual R e d Chip 
pe r fo rmance based on past beta. 
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M o k (1990) men t ioned tha t t he re jec t ion of cons tan t b e t a over t i m e is n o t t o o 
surpr is ing in v i e w of frequent changes in a f i r m ' s fondamental s t ruc ture and t h e ever -
chang ing e c o n o m i c env i ronment . 
Ano the r poss ib le exp lana t ion could b e tha t B e t a va lue m a y b e dr iven b y th in -
t rad ing e f f ec t s par t icular ly in t he early yea r s o f t h e analysis，so tha t general ly the s tocks 
have lower b e t a u p o n its l ist ing in t he early years，but b e c o m e aggress ive gradually. 
T h e fluctuation of b e t a va lues of individual s tocks w e r e m o r e volat i le t h a n t h e 
w h o l e g r o u p average. C h a n g e in securi ty be ta s d i f fer f r o m s tock t o stock. S o m e wil l g o 
up , some wil l g o down . These changes t end to cancel ou t in a por t fo l io (a g roup o f 
s tocks) and the re w o u l d b e less change in t he actual B e t a o n por t fo l io t han o n 
individual stocks. 
Individual H Shares 
Table 8 repor t s t he be tas fo r individual H Shares in 8 subperiods, ( insuff ic ient da ta 
t o const i tute t he ful l per iod analysis 1993-1997) . T h e bi -year ly be ta coef f ic ien t also 
range wide ly across all s tocks，from a l ow of - 0 .026 ( D o n g F a n g M a c h i n e r y in t h e 
later h a l f o f 1996) t o a h igh o f l .897(Harbin P o w e r E q u i p m e n t in later h a l f o f 1997). 
It is interest ing that B e t a va lues o f m o s t H Shares w e r e h igh in the bear marke t , i.e. 
1.394 in the later h a l f y e a r of 1997, whi le they w e r e l ow in the bull marke t , i.e. 0 .711 in 
t he first half year of 1997. I t seems tha t H shares responded sensit ively in a bear 
marke t bu t do not respond accordingly in a b o o m market . In other words , they w e r e 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The msk and Return Characteristics ofHong Kong Listed Red-Chips and H Shares ^0 
H Shares w e r e ove rwhe lming poor compared wi th other H o n g K o n g listed stocks. 
D u r i n g the u p per iod in the first h a l f y e a r of 1997，only four H Shares ' be t a va lue w e r e 
greater than one. (Maanshan I ron & Steel - 1.045，Jilin Chemica l - 1.026, Tianj in 
Boha i _ 1.144 and China Shipping D e v e l o p m e n t - 1.564). However , during the d o w n 
per iod in the second half year of 1997，all H Shares except three compan ies 
(Guangdong K e l o n — 0.955，Qingling M o t o r s 一 0 .765 and Guangshen Ra i lway 一 0 .811) 
had a be ta m o r e than one. 
Inves tors must be very carefol in choos ing H Shares. Fundamen ta l analysis could 
b e important . The poor managemen t , inferior products combined wi th inf lexible 
bus iness operat ions could hamper their earning potentials. 
Sectoral portfolios ofRed Chips 
W h e n looking at the change of sectoral be ta o f R e d Chips over 10 subperiods (Fig 
10)，most sectors fo l low the similar p a t t e m except the Oil and M i n i n g sector, which 
f luc tua te the mos t over time，especially dur ing the period be tween 96 and 97. In fact , 
this sector can be very dif ferent from the marke t due to its industrial specif ic elements . 
Whi le be ta o f m o s t sectors are relatively stable over time，we can also observed 
an upward t rend in be ta value for most o f t h e sectors from t ime to time，indicating the 
growing sensitive of Red Chips in respond to the market change. Conglomera te 
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Sectoral portfolios ofH Shares 
W h e n looking at the change of sectoral beta o f H Shares over 8 subperiods (Fig 11)，it 
is found that the beta value of H Shares are rather fluctuating, especially for the 
Chemical and Infrastructure Sector. Their beta values are rather difficult to forecast. 
One possible reason may be their main business entities are located in the Mainland in 
which the economy environment is quite different f rom that in Hong Kong. Therefore 
it might be normal even i f t h e i r share price comovement is quite different f rom H o n g 
Kong market. Moreover，Chemical H-shares have also persistently underperformed the 
Hong Kong broad market, (i.e. Higher beta value when the market is bearish and lower 
beta value when the market is bullish) Their prices have weakened as global chemical 
pricing has drifted down，? However, thinking in another way, they might be supervised 
by inferior management and thus their products are not competitive in the market. 
Therefore，no matter how good is the economy，their operation still incurs losses, and 
the situation might be even worst when the economy environment deteriorates. 
3 7 McElligott, Suzanne. _H-Share Market Attracts Foreign Investors" Chemical Week, 28 Aug - 4 Sep 96’ pp. 48. 
Th.mkmdReturn CharacteHsths^gK-gL^^d^^^fh^^^^^^^^ff^^^^^^____^  
Srrtion 4 ^ …译 nnd Retiim Ke1ationshm 
ln this section, we will discuss on the beta value of Red Chips m the Full 
period 1993 -1997. Although only nine Red Chips have been listed for more than 
five years, the result - beta values are more reliable due to less thin trading effects 
for these stocks. It will then proceed to look at the risk and return of the Red 
Chips. The risk is divided into systematic and nonsystematic components, in 
which investors would know by how far they can reduce the risk by diversifying. 
F o r t h e five year pe r iod as a w h o l e , as s h o w n in Table 9，Ka W a h B a n k has t h e 
lowest beta value of 1.065 and Guangdong Investment has the highest beta value of 
1.356. E v e n t h e l owes t b e t a o f R e d Ch ips is a b o v e 1 over t he f i ve years , ind ica t ing 
tha t t h e R e d C h i p s b e l o n g t o aggress ive g r o u p o f a s s e t s . 
W e can see from F igu re 12 tha t t h e sectoral g roup ing o f R e d C h i p s has bea r ing o n 
its b e t a va lue o f t h e M per iod 1993 - 1997. All R e d C h i p s h a v e be t a s we l l a b o v e 1； 
t he P rope r ty & Cons t ruc t ion sec tor ha s t he h ighes t beta . T w o s tocks in th i s sec tor h a v e 
t he b e t a va lue a b o v e 1.2. T h e sec tor w i th lowes t b e t a is B a n k i n g and F inance , bu t their 
be t a va lue are still a b o v e one , sl ightly b e l o w t h o s e o f o t h e r sectors . R e d C h i p s p r o v e d 
t hemse lves t o b e aggress ive s tocks. 
T h e vi tal statist ics such as the ave rage annua l ized re turns , t he overal l r i sks b e i n g 
m e a s u r e d b y the va r i ance o f r e t u r n s and b e t a va lues fo r t he — pe r iod are s u m m a r i z e d 
in Table 10. O n average . R e d C h i p s had an ave rage annua l ized re tu rn o f 2 8 . 5 4 % , and 
an ave rage va r iance of re turns o f 0 .106%. T h e average annua l ized marke t re turn is 
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TheRiskundmurn CharacterisHcsofHongKmgMReMdpsmdHSkares 56 
Fig. 12 Beta v a l u e of Red Chips by S e c t o r (Full Period 1 9 9 3 -
1997) 
1 .600 "~~" 
1 .400 Z Z I i ^ ^ 7 T Z Z Z Z Z 
0) • ~"~~ j T z z z m r t u n 1 1 ^ ^ ^ 
. 1 . 0 0 0 • • ^ ^ r ]  
> 0.800 
I 0 .600 —— . ： ：；； i 
m 0 .400 ——！； | . t ' H 1 _ : 1 I Z Z Z J 
= t i i = i i f c = W M f c : ^ / / / / 
/ / / z 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TheRiskundRemrn Charact^McsofHmgKmgL_ReiMdps-^^^ 58 
That m e a n s for every uni t o f r i s k，R e d Chips prov ide 1 .0356 return，while the 
average o f a l l s tocks o n the S tock E x c h a n g e o f H o n g K o n g prov ided 2 .775 ofre turn .^^ 
In other words , a l though the m e a n re turn ra te fo r R e d Chips in last f ive years w a s 
nearly doub t t he marke t rate, they w e r e even m o r e volat i le in w h i c h inves tors should b e 
jus t i f ied fo r m o r e return, i.e. higher level r isk w a s no t commensu ra t e wi th a h igher 
r e t u m rate. W e can also compare our f inding wi th the marke t index from table 11, 
Fo r AOI，the re turn per unit of risk is 2.62，whereas that of H S C C I is a round 1.29， 
w h i c h is slightly higher than our calculated one. 
D e c o m p o s i n g the total r isk o f R e d Ch ips into Systemat ic and Unsys tema t i c risk, 
w e found that there w a s about 6 8 % o f r i s k be longed to the Unsys temat ic risk，in w h i c h 
inves tors can b e el iminated th rough diversifying. 
Table 11 Dai ly Re tu rn and Variance of d i f ferent indexes 
i i i i i i i m i i i p l l ^ i i l I l f H J ^ i P H ^ J 
5 S T " 0 . 0 5 6 5 % o m n o . o i i 9 % 一 
v S i ^ 0 . 0 2 1 5 % 0 . 0 5 4 0 % _ % 
MeanA^ariance 2.62 ^ 0.18 
We can also see that the return per unit risk of H K C E I is only 0.18, wh ich is 
exceptionally low w h e n compared wi th other t w o indexes. 
38 Calculation Formular - average annual return 12601 variance 
Thenkkandmurn amracteristksofmmgKrngmedRedai^^^^^^^f^f^^ 59 
CHAPTERV 
CONCLUSIONS 
L o o k i n g ahead , w i th m o r e M a i n l a n d enterpr ises ra is ing fixnds in H o n g K o n g , t he 
n u m b e r o f R e d C h i p s and H Shares is expec ted t o increase rapidly. T h e R e d C h i p s and 
H Shares w o u l d t he r e fo r e f o r m a g r o w i n g and impor tan t segment o f t h e H o n g K o n g 
s tock marke t . 
In fact，there are m a n y potent ia l R e d Ch ips wa i t ing t o b e added to t he index in one 
year t ime w h e n M f i l l i n g the requi red l is t ing pe r iod in H o n g K o n g , such as Be i j i ng 
Enterpr i ses , S h u m Yip Investment，China R e s o u r c e s Be i j i ng Land，China Telecom，etc. 
H Shares are great in f luenced b y t he e c o n o m i c env i ronmen t o f China. C o n t i n u o u s 
economic r e f o r m is expec ted t o benef i t Ch ina in long term. Shor t t e r m deve lopmen t , 
however , is expec ted to b e a diff icul t p rocess as the e c o n o m y fa l ls in to the p rospec t s o f 
bankrup tc ies and u n e m p l o y m e n t . 
F r o m our analysis, H Shares w e r e found consis tent ly u n d e r f o r m i n g the marke t in 
the last f e w years. For R e d Chip, a l though the m e a n re turn w e r e h igher than the 
marke t , actually investor of R e d Ch ips s tocks are taking a r isk level h igher than it 
should be. W e c a n n o t j u s t i f y t h e h igh risk involved t o the return. 
TheRiskan4Remm Char<MicsofHongKmgl^^H^d^^h^P^^^^f^^f^^^^^^___^  
Since the m i n i m u m capital requires to obtain one lot o f R e d Chip or H share is 
relatively smaller than some b lue chips, small retail investors are attracted to these 
companies , especially dur ing the booming market . Therefore , small investors should 
bear in mind that the return from these t w o kind of stocks are not sufficiently just i f ied. 
They should look for fundamenta l w h e n picking u p their choice. 
Inves tors are advised to look for stocks wi th stable earnings s tream and strong 
financial backing. Companies wi th good management and a strong market posit ion are 
also key among the selection. Therefore , investors could consider red-chip companies 
wi th proven management ability and strong backing f r o m controll ing shareholders. 
Good management and posit ive industry ftmdamentals will ul t imately drive and sustain 
share prices. 
In addition, investors are advised to avoid concentrat ing on any single stock. F rom 
our analysis, there w a s 6 8 % o f u n s y s t e m a t i c risk o f R e d Chips wh ich can be el iminated 
by diversifying. 
However , for H Shares, the companies still need t ime to get improved and 
structurally reformed. 
rheBhkmdReturn CkaraaerisHcsofHongKongmedRed-CkipsandHSkares 61 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
Beta is a risk measure that arises from the relationship between the r e tum on a 
stock and the re tum on the market. The Single-Index Capital Model is applied in this 
study，in which the Red Chips and H shares' stock performance is measured in 
correlation to the broad market. However，the risk of a firm should be determined by 
some combination of the f i rm 's fimdamentals and the market characteristics of the 
firm's stock. Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes (1970) had examined the relationship 
between seven f irm variables and the Beta on a company ' s stock. The seven variables 
were 1) Dividend payout, 2) Asset growth, 3) Leverage，4) Liquidity, 5) Asset size 6) 
Earning variability, and 7) Accounting Beta. 
I f t h e s e relationships o f R e d Chips and H shares could be determined，it would 
lead to a better understand o f B e t a and to better forecast Betas of these China related 
stocks. 
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